This paper settles the sample complexity of single-parameter revenue maximization by showing matching upper and lower bounds, up to a poly-logarithmic factor, for all families of value distributions that have been considered in the literature. The upper bounds are unified under a novel framework, which builds on the strong revenue monotonicity by Devanur, Huang, and Psomas (STOC 2016), and an information theoretic argument. This is fundamentally different from the previous approaches that rely on either constructing an ϵ-net of the mechanism space, explicitly or implicitly via statistical learning theory, or learning an approximately accurate version of the virtual values. To our knowledge, it is the first time information theoretical arguments are used to show sample complexity upper bounds, instead of lower bounds. Our lower bounds are also unified under a meta construction of hard instances.
INTRODUCTION
Suppose there is one item for sale and there are n bidders. Each bidder has a private value for the item that is independently, but not necessarily identically, drawn from the corresponding prior distribution, denoted as D = D 1 × D 2 × · · · × D n . What is the optimal mechanism in terms of the expected revenue? This classic problem of revenue maximization was solved by Myerson [21] analytically. Given the prior distributions from which the bidders' values are drawn, in particular, given their cumulative distribution functions (cdf), denoted as F i 's, and probability density functions (pdf), denoted as f i 's, the optimal auction is characterized by the virtual value functions:
Informally, the optimal auction lets the bidder with the largest non-negative virtual value win the item, and charges the winner a payment that equals the threshold value above which she wins. 1 From an algorithmic viewpoint, however, the problem is not fully settled because the cdf and pdf of the prior distributions are rarely given as input in practice. Cole and Roughgarden [8] initiated the study of the following sample complexity problem: Suppose the algorithm has access to the prior distributions only in the form of i.i.d. samples, how many samples are sufficient and necessary for finding an approximately optimal auction? In particular, Cole and Roughgarden [8] considered the multiplicative 1 − ϵ approximation, and regular and MHR distributions, and showed that the sample complexity is polynomial in the number of bidders n, and ϵ −1 . Subsequently, there is a long line of work in this direction, either to improve the sample complexity bounds [9, 20, 24] , or to consider other families of distributions such as bounded support distributions, with both multiplicative and additive approximations [9, 14] , or the special cases with a single bidder [18] or i.i.d. bidders [22] , or the generalization to multiple heterogeneous items [1, 7, 15] . Despite many efforts, we still cannot pin down the asymptotically optimal sample complexity for any of the families of distributions considered in the literature, other than the special case of a single bidder. Table 1 summarizes the state-of-the-art upper and lower bounds prior to this paper.
Previous Approaches
We first present a brief overview on the previous approaches for analyzing the sample complexity of revenue maximization, which can be categorized into two groups, and explain their limitations.
Statistical Learning Theory. The first approach relies on constructing an ϵ-net of the mechanism space, namely, a subset of mechanisms such that for any distribution in the family, there always exists an approximately optimal mechanism in the subset. Then, it remains to identify such an approximately optimal mechanism in the ϵ-net. This can be done via a standard concentration plus Regular Ω(max{nϵ −1 , ϵ −3 }) [8, 18] Õ(nϵ −4 ) [9] MHR Ω(max{nϵ −1/2 , ϵ −3/2 }) [8, 18] Õ(nϵ −3 ) [9, 20] [1, H ] Ω(Hϵ −2 ) [18] Õ(nHϵ −3 ) [9] [0, 1]-additive Ω(ϵ −2 ) [18] Õ(nϵ −3 ) [9, 14] union bounds combo. Informally, the resulting sample complexity will be: 2 log size of the ϵ-net ϵ 2 .
The construction of the ϵ-net can be either explicit (e.g., [9, 14, 15] ), or implicit via various learning dimensions from statistical learning theory (e.g., [20, 24] ).
The main limitation of this approach is that the size of the ϵ-net seems to have an unavoidable exponential dependence in ϵ −1 (see below for an example). By the sample complexity uppeer bound in Eqn. (2) , this exponential dependence leads to an at least cubic dependence in ϵ −1 in the sample complexity upper bounds. For example, we sketch below an explicit construction of the ϵ-net by Devanur et al. [9] . With an appropriate discretization, it suffices to consider ϵ −1 distinct values. Further, since the optimal auction chooses the winner to maximize virtual value, it suffices to know the ordering of 0 and ϕ i (v)'s for all n bidders and all ϵ −1 values. Hence, the number of auctions that we need to consider is no more than the number of orderings over the nϵ −1 virtual values ϕ i (v)'s and 0, which equals (nϵ −1 + 1)! and is singly exponential in both n and ϵ −1 . Getting rid of the exponential dependence in ϵ −1 intuitively means that it suffices to consider a constant number of distinct values, which seems implausible.
Learning the Virtual Values. An alternative approach (e.g., [8, 22] ) is to learn the individual value distributions well enough to obtain enough approximately accurate information about the virtual values, which induces a mechanism. Then, we analyze the revenue approximation using the connections between expected revenue and virtual values. Importantly, this approach does not need to take a union bound over exponentially many candidate mechanisms, circumventing the bottleneck that introduces the undesirable cubic dependence in ϵ −1 in the learning theory approach. Indeed, for the special case of independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) bidders with [0, 1]-bounded distributions and additive approximation, Roughgarden and Schrijvers [22] showed a sample complexity upper bound ofÕ(n 2 ϵ −2 ), which is the only previous example, to our knowledge, with a sub-cubic dependence in ϵ −1 .
The main limitation of this approach roots in the form of the virtual value as defined in (1). It involves three components, the value v, the complementary cumulative distribution function 1 − F i (v), a.k.a., the quantile, and the pdf f i (v). Here, the value v is given as input; the quantile 1 − F i (v) is relatively easy to estimate accurately via standard concentration inequalities. It is, however, impossible to get an accurate estimation of the density function f i in general. 
As a result, it is infeasible to learn the virtual values accurately point-wise. This is a major technical hurdle that prevents existing works using this approach from getting tight sample complexity upper bounds; in particular, they all have super-linear dependence in n. Even for the special case of i.i.d. bidders, the bound is quadratic in n [22] ; the dependence is at least n 7 for the general case [8] .
Note that a linear dependence in n follows almost trivially from the learning theory approach (e.g., [9] ).
Prior Knowledge of the Distribution Family. Another limitation of the existing approaches is that they generally rely on knowing the family of distributions upfront. Even for the special case of a single bidder, the best known algorithms are different for regular, MHR, and bound-support distributions (e.g., [18] ). For MHR distributions, we may simply pick the optimal price with respect to (w.r.t.) the empirical distribution, i.e., the uniform distribution over the samples. For regular and [1, H ] bounded support distributions, however, we need to introduce a threshold δ > 0 and to choose the optimal price subject to having a sale probability at least δ . Further, the threshold is chosen differently for regular and [1, H ] bounded support distributions. If we fail to introduce a threshold when it is an arbitrary regular distribution, the expected revenue may not converge to the optimal at all [10] . If we set the threshold under the belief that the distribution has a [1, H ] bounded support while it is in fact an arbitrary regular distribution, the convergence rate will be far from optimal. It would definitely be nice to have a more robust algorithm.
Our Contributions
We introduce an algorithm that achieves the optimal sample complexity, up to a poly-logarithmic factor, simultaneously for all families of distributions that have been considered in the literature. Our upper and lower bounds, summarized in Table 2 , improve the best known bounds in all cases.
Our Algorithm. The algorithm constructs from the samples a dominated empirical distribution, denoted asẼ =Ẽ 1 ×Ẽ 2 × · · · ×Ẽ n , which is dominated by the true value distribution D in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance, but is as close to D as possible. Then, it chooses the optimal mechanism w.r.t.Ẽ. We call it the dominated empirical Myerson auction.
To construct the dominated empirical distribution, we first look at the estimation error by the empirical distribution, in terms of the difference between the empirical quantiles and the true quantiles. This can be bounded using standard concentration inequalities. For example, suppose a value v has quantile q. Then, Bernstein inequality gives that, with high probability, its quantile in the empirical distribution is approximately equal to q, up to an additive error of:
To ensure that the error bound holds for all values, one can simply take a union bound at the cost of an extra logarithmic factor inside the square root. Intuitively, the dominated empirical distribution is obtained by subtracting this term from the quantile of each value v in the empirical distribution. See Section 3 for the formal definitions of the dominated empirical distribution and the algorithm. Next we explain the main difference between our algorithm and those in previous works, with the exception of Roughgarden and Schrijvers [22] . Previous works generally pick the optimal auction w.r.t. the empirical distribution, with a distribution-familydependent pre-/post-processing on the sample values, in the form of truncating large but rare values and/or a discretization of the values. The prep/post-rocessing is to avoid choosing the auction based on some rare but high values in the samples. In contrast, our algorithm picks the optimal auction w.r.t. the dominated empirical distribution, without any pre-/post-processing or any knowledge of the underlying family of distributions. The conservative estimates of quantiles by the dominated empirical distribution implicitly tune down the impact of rare but high values, simultaneously for all families of distributions.
The algorithm by Roughgarden and Schrijvers [22] is the most similar one to ours. They also constructed a dominated empirical distribution and picked the corresponding optimal auction. A subtle difference is that they used the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality [12] to bound the estimation error of the empirical distribution and to construct the dominated empirical distribution, which on one hand avoided losing a logarithmic factor from the union bound, but on the other hand did not get the better bounds for values with quantiles close to 0 or 1 as in (3) . The latter property is crucial for our analysis. We leave as an interesting open question whether there is a strengthened version of the DKW inequality with quantile-dependent bounds. Such an inequality will improve the logarithmic factor in the upper bounds of this paper. We stress that while the algorithms are similar in spirit, our analysis is fundamentally different, as we will explain next. Importantly, our sample complexity upper bounds hold for the general non-i.i.d. case while the upper bound of Roughgarden and Schrijvers [22] holds only for the special case of i.i.d. bidders.
Analysis via Revenue Monotonicity. Our analysis consists of two components. The first one is two inequalities that lower bound the expected revenue of the dominated empirical Myerson auction on the true distribution, where the inequalities are enabled by the strong revenue monotonicity of single-parameter problems by Devanur et al. [9] . The strong revenue monotonicity states that the optimal auction w.r.t. a distribution that is dominated by the true distribution gets at least the optimal revenue of the dominated distribution. In particular, running the dominated empirical Myerson on the true value distribution D gets at least the optimal revenue of the dominated empirical distributionẼ. Further, consider a doubly shaded version of the true distribution, denoted asD, which intuitively is obtained by subtracting twice the error term in (3) from the quantiles of the true distribution. Then,D is dominated byẼ and, thus, its optimal revenue is at most that ofẼ. This weaker notion of revenue monotonicity is folklore in the literature and follows as a direct corollary of the stronger notion. Therefore, we conclude that the expected revenue of the dominated empirical Myerson auction is at least the optimal revenue of the doubly shaded distributionD. It remains to compare the optimal revenue of D andD.
This idea is quite powerful on its own. The key observation is that D approximately preserves the probability density/mass of D almost point-wise, except for a small subset of values that have little impact on the optimal revenue. Intuitively, this is because it consistently underestimates the quantiles; in contrast, the empirical distribution has fluctuations in its estimations. Hence,D approximately preserves the virtual values of D almost point-wise, circumventing the technical hurdle faced by the second previous approach discussed in Section 1.1. By this idea and standard accounting arguments for the expected revenue, we can get the optimal sample complexity upper bound for regular distributions in Table 2 , and match the best previous upper bounds for the other three families of distributions in Table 1 .
Analysis via Information Theory. To get the optimal sample complexity upper bounds for all families of distributions under a unified framework, we need the second idea, namely, to bound the difference between the optimal revenues of D andD with an information theoretic argument. The argument consists of two claims: 1) the distributions D andD are similar in the information theoretic sense so that it takes many samples to distinguish them, and 2) we can estimate the expected revenue of any given mechanism on D andD with a small number of samples. Concretely, we will show that the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence between D andD is at mostÕ( n m ), omitting some caveats which we will explain in details in Section 3. By standard information theoretic arguments, it implies that one needs at leastΩ( m n ) samples to distinguish these two distributions. For example, consider a [0, 1]-bounded distribution D and an additive ϵ approximation. Suppose m is at leastÕ(nϵ −2 ) as in Table 2 . Then, we get that it takes at least C · ϵ −2 samples to distinguish D andD for some sufficiently large constant C > 0. On the other hand, it takes less than C · ϵ −2 samples to estimate the expected revenue of any mechanism on both D andD up to an additive ϵ factor. Thus, the expected revenue of any mechanism differs by at most ϵ on the two distributions; otherwise, we can distinguish them with less than C · ϵ −2 samples by estimating the expected revenue of the mechanism. As a result, the optimal revenues of D andD differ by at most ϵ.
To our knowledge, this is the first time information theory is used to show sample complexity upper bounds for revenue maximization. Previously, it was used only for lower bounds (e.g., [18] ). We believe it will find further applications in studying the sample complexity of multi-parameter revenue maximization and other learning problems. We stress that our algorithm is constructive and, in fact, can be implemented in quasi-linear time; 3 both the doubly shaded distributionD and the information theoretic arguments are used only in the analysis.
Lower Bound Constructions. Our lower bounds are unified under a meta construction, with some components chosen based on the family of distributions. We briefly sketch the construction below. Let the first bidder's value distribution be a point mass. She will serve as the default winner in the optimal auction. The value distribution of each of the other n − 1 bidders will be either D h or D ℓ . These two distributions satisfy that there is a value interval such that for any value in it, the corresponding virtual value wins over bidder 1 if and only if the distribution is D h . Both D h and D ℓ will have an O( 1 n ) chance of realizing a value in this interval. Intuitively, to find a near optimal mechanism we must be able to distinguish the bidders with distribution D h from those with distribution D ℓ . Finally, we will construct D h and D ℓ to be similar so that it takes many samples to distinguish them. The meta construction, inspired by the hard instances by Cole and Roughgarden [8] , can be viewed as a non-trivial generalization of the lower bound framework by Huang et al. [18] for the special case of single bidder.
Other Related Works
Prior to Cole and Roughgarden [8] , there were a few sporadic works that had the flavor of learning the optimal price/auction from samples (e.g., [10, 13] ).
The learning theory approach has also been used to learn approximately optimal auction among a restricted family of simple auctions, both for single-parameter problems [19] , and for multiparameter problems [1, 2, 7, 20, 24] . To learn an approximately optimal auction without restrictions in multi-parameter problems, Dughmi et al. [11] showed that it needed exponentially many samples in general;
Gonczarowski and Weinberg [15] proved a polynomial sample complexity upper bound for the special case when bidders' valuations were additive, if we allowed approximate truthfulness.
The online learning version has also been considered, both in the full information setting, i.e., the seller runs a direction revelation auction and observes the bidder's valuation, and in the bandit setting, i.e., the seller runs a posted price auction and only observes if the bidder buys the item. Blum and Hartline [5] introduced the optimal algorithm in terms of a regret bound that scaled with H , the upper bound on bidders' values. Bubeck et al. [6] further improved the regret bound to scale with the optimal price instead of H , and their algorithm matched the optimal sample complexity bounds when the bidder's values in different rounds were i.i.d. from a prior distribution.
Intriguingly, even the weaker notion of revenue monotonicity ceases to hold in multi-parameter problems [17] , while approximate versions are showed for restricted families of valuations [23, 25] .
PRELIMINARIES 2.1 Model
Let there be a single item for sale, and let there be n bidders. Each bidder i has a private valuation v i ≥ 0 for getting the item, where v i is independently drawn from the corresponding prior distribution
We consider direct revelation mechanisms, each of which consists of an allocation function x and a payment function p. First, each bidder submits a bid b i ≥ 0. Then, x i (b) denotes the probability that bidder i gets the item, and p i (b) denotes the expected payment by bidder i. Since there is only one item, we have n i=1
The seller seeks to maximize the expectation of the revenue, which is the sum of bidders' payments, n i=1 p i (b). We remark that our algorithm and the framework for proving sample complexity upper bounds apply to more general singleparameter problems, which is deferred to the full version [16] .
By the revelation principle, it suffices to focus on Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanisms, which mean that for any bidder i and any value v i , conditioned on the other bidders bidding truthfully, i.e., b −i = v −i , bidding b i = v i maximizes bidder i's expected utility over the randomness of other bidders' values, and guarantees non-negative expected utility. A stronger notion is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanisms, which means that bidding b i = v i always maximizes bidder i's utility, and guarantees it is non-negative, no matter what other bidders bid. Our algorithms always return mechanisms that satisfy the stronger notion, i.e., DSIC.
Myerson's Optimal Auction. If the prior distribution D is given as input, the revenue maximizing mechanisms is fully characterized by Myerson [21] . Interestingly, Myerson's optimal auction is DSIC but is optimal among all BIC mechanisms. The characterization relies on the following notion of virtual values. We first explain this notion assuming the distributions are continuous and have positive densities as in Myeron's original paper. For any bidder i, let F i and f i denote the cdf and pdf of the value distributions, the virtual value of bidder i when her value is i is
If for all i, the virtual value ϕ i (v i ) is monotonically non-decreasing in v i , the distribution D is said to be regular. If ϕ i (v i ) further has derivatives at least 1 point-wise, D is said to have monotone hazard rate (MHR). Discrete versions of regular and MHR distributions over non-negative integers are also considered in the literature [3, 13] , where f i (v i ) is replaced with the probability mass of v i . The optimal auction is simple if the value distributions are MHR or even regular. It lets the bidder with the largest non-negative virtual value win the item, breaking ties arbitrarily; if no bidder has a non-negative virtual value, no one gets the item. The winner pays the threshold value at or above which she wins.
For general distributions, virtual values may not be monotone. We need an extra step that defines an ironed version of the virtual value that is monotone. We will use the following definition of ironed virtual values so that it generalizes to general distributions that may be a mixture of continuous and discrete distributions. Define the mapping from quantiles to values as v i (q) = sup{v : 1 − F i (v) ≤ q}. Define the revenue curve over the quantile space as R i (q) = q · v i (q). Let the ironed revenue curveR i (q) be the convex hull of R i (q). The ironed virtual valueφ i (v i ) is the right derivative ofR i 1 − F i (v i ) . Then, Myerson's optimal auction picks a winner based on the ironed virtual value instead of the virtual value, and charges the threshold value accordingly. Sample Complexity. Now suppose we can access the prior distribution D only in the form of m i.i.d. samples. For a give family of distributions D (e.g., regular, MHR, bounded support, etc.), the sample complexity of the revenue maximization problem is defined to be the (asymptotically) smallest number m so that there is an algorithm satisfying that for any distribution D ∈ D, given m i.i.d. samples from D, it learns a mechanism that is a 1 − ϵ multiplicative approximation in revenue with high probability. We are also interested in an ϵ additive approximation in some cases.
Technical Preliminaries
Bernstein Inequality. Our algorithm and analysis will make use of the standard concentration bound by Bernstein [4] , as stated in the next lemma.
, and |X i | ≤ M for some constant M > 0. Then, for all positive t, we have:
Strong Revenue Monotonicity. A distribution D first-order stochastically dominates another distributionD, or simply D dominatesD for brevity, if for every i ∈ [n], D i dominatesD i in that for every value v, its quantile in D i is weakly larger than that inD i . We denote this by D ⪰D.
Devanur et al. [9] showed a strong notion of revenue monotonicity as follows:
Lemma 2 (Strong Revenue Monotonicity [9] ). Let D andD be two product value distributions such that D ⪰D. Recall that MD is the optimal auction forD. Then, we have:
The weaker notion of revenue monotonicity that is folklore in the literature follows as a corollary.
Lemma 3 (Weak Revenue Monotonicity). Let D andD be two product value distributions such that D ⪰D. Then, we have:
Information Theory. Consider two probability measure P and Q over a sample space Ω. The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence is defined as follows:
We further consider the following symmetric version:
A classification algorithm A : Ω m → {P, Q } distinguishes P and Q correctly with m samples if for any D ∈ {P, Q }, A(ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω m ) = D with probability at least 2 3 , where ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . , ω m are i.i.d. samples from D. The upper and lower bounds in this paper both use the following connection between the number of samples needed to distinguish two distributions and their KL divergence. Lemma 4 (e.g., see [18] ). Suppose there is a classification algorithm that distinguishes P and Q correctly with m samples. Then, the number of samples m is at least:
UPPER BOUNDS
We present in this section an algorithm and its analysis that achieve the optimal sample complexity, up to a poly-logarithmic factor, simultaneously for all families of distributions in the literature. The proofs of some lemmas that are relatively standard are deferred to the full version [16] , which also includes a discussion on the optimality of our algorithm in the special case of a single bidder.
Dominated Empirical Myerson
We first define the following function: Given this function, we now present our algorithm below as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Dominated Empirical Myerson
Input: m i.i.d. samples from the value distribution D = D 1 × D 2 × · · · × D n Output: a mechanism that decides the allocation and payment given bids from n bidders 1: Let E i be the empirical distribution, i.e., the uniform distribution over the samples of bidder i.
. That is, let q E i (v) be the quantile of E i ; the quantile ofẼ i is as follows:
Our algorithm relies on constructing from the samples a distributionẼ dominated by the true value distribution but is as close to it as possible in a sense. We will refer toẼ as the dominated empirical distribution, which is intuitively a shaded version of the empirical distribution via function s m,n,δ . This is formalized by the following two lemmas. Lemma 5. With probability at least 1 − δ , for any value v ≥ 0, for any bidder i ∈ [n], v's quantiles in D i and E i satisfy that:
Lemma 6. Assuming the bounds in Lemma 5, we have:
We show that Algorithm 1 is "universally" optimal in the sense that it achieves the following sample complexity upper bounds simultaneously for all families of distributions in the literature. We will establish their optimality, up to a poly-logarithmic factor, with the lower bounds in Section 4. Theorem 1. For any 0 < ϵ < 1 and any n-bidder product value distribution D, Algorithm 1 returns a mechanism with an expected revenue at least (1 − ϵ)Opt(D), with probability at least 1 − δ , if:
and D is MHR; or
and D has a bounded support in [1, H ] coordinate-wise.
We also have that its expected revenue is at least Opt(D) − ϵ if:
and D has a bounded support in [0, 1] coordinate-wise.
Meta Analysis
Step 1: Analysis via Revenue Monotonicity. The first idea in our analysis is to lower bound the expected revenue of the dominated empirical Myerson auction with inequalities enabled by revenue monotonicity. We start by defining an auxiliary distributionD which intuitively is a doubly shaded version of the original distribution D such that it is dominated byẼ. Consider the following function:
We further allow it to operate on distributions the same way as the previous function s m,n,δ . Then, letD = d m,n,δ (D) be the auxiliary distribution.
Lemma 7. Assuming the bounds in Lemma 5, we have that:
Next, we lower bound the expected revenue of the dominated empirical Myerson auction by the optimal revenue of the auxiliary distribution using revenue monotonicity. Lemma 8. With probability at least 1 − δ , we have:
Proof. We will prove the inequality when the bounds in Lemma 5 hold, which happens with probability at least 1 − δ . It follows from the following sequence of inequalities:
(Lemma 3, Lemma 7) □ Given the above inequality, it suffices to show Opt(D) ≥ (1 − ϵ)Opt(D) for the first three cases which consider multiplicative approximation in Theorem 1, and to show Opt(D) ≥ Opt(D) − ϵ for the last case which considers additive approximation.
As we remarked in Section 1, this idea of bounding the expected revenue of the dominated empirical Myerson auction via revenue monotonicity, instead of concentration inequalities as in previous works, is quite powerful on its own. In particular, the auxiliary distributionD approximately preserves the density and virtual value of the original distribution D almost point-wise. The full version [16] includes a discussion on how to build on this observation and standard accounting techniques for expected revenue to show the optimal sample complexity upper bounds for the case of regular distributions as stated in Theorem 1, and for the other three cases weaker upper bounds which nevertheless match the best previous bounds already.
Step 2: Analysis via Information Theory. Our second idea is to use an information theoretic argument to show that the optimal revenue ofD is a 1 − ϵ approximation (or an ϵ additive approximation) to that of D. 
for a sufficiently small constant in the second asymptotic notation. This is the main technical component behind the information theoretic argument. See Lemma 10 for details. Then, we claim that the optimal revenue of D andD must be within an additive factor of ϵ from each other. In particular, we claim that:
Otherwise, we would be able to distinguish these two distributions with O(ϵ −2 ) samples by estimating the expected revenue of M D . This contradicts the assumption that the KL divergence of the two distributions is small. Formal Analysis. More generally, we show the following lemma. Lemma 9. If two distributions D ′ andD ′ satisfy that for some N > 0, and some α > 0:
(1) They are close in KL-divergence:
for some sufficiently small constant c > 0. (2) For any mechanism, and any of these two distributions, N samples runs are sufficient to estimate the expected revenue up to an additive α factor with probability at least 2 3 . Then, we have:
Proof. We will show a stronger claim that for any mechanism M, it holds that:
Suppose not. Consider the following classification algorithm that takes N i.i.d. samples from an unknown distribution that is either D ′ orD ′ , and identifies which one it is correctly with probability at least 2 3 . (1) Run M on the N samples from the unknown distribution to estimate the expected revenue up to an additive α factor.
The correctness of the algorithm follows by condition 2 in the lemma statement and the assumption (for contrary) that Rev(M,D ′ ) < Rev(M, D ′ )−2α. Hence, there exists an algorithm that distinguishes the two distributions using N samples. This, however, contradicts Lemma 4 and condition 1 in the statement of this lemma, because they together indicate that no algorithm can distinguish D ′ andD ′ correctly using N samples.
We stress that to get the contradiction it suffices to show the existence of the algorithm. How one can acquire the necessary information, in particular, the value of Rev(M, D ′ ), to implement the algorithm is not important. □ Intuitively, we would like to let D ′ = D,D ′ =D, and α = ϵOpt(D) (or α = ϵ in the case of additive approximation) in the above lemma to finish the analysis. However, the two conditions in Lemma 9 need not hold for distributions D andD in general. The first condition may not hold, for example, if some large values with tiny quantiles in D is not in the support ofD as a result of the double shading by d m,n,δ . The KL divergence will be infinity in this case. The second condition may also fail, when the value distribution D is unbounded, as in the regular and MHR case.
To circumvent these obstacles, we will construct surrogate versions of D andD, denoted as D ′ andD ′ respectively, which do satisfy the two conditions in statement of Lemma 9, and will relate their optimal revenues with those of D andD respectively to finish the analysis.
We first present in the next lemma some sufficient conditions under which we can bound the KL divergence of a distribution and its doubly shaded version. 
In light of the conditions in Lemma 10 under which we can upper bound the KL divergence of a distribution and its doubly shaded version given by function d m,n,δ , we will construct the surrogate distribution D ′ by truncating both the top and the bottom ends of the original distribution D, and letD ′ = d m,n,δ (D ′ ) be the other surrogate distribution.
Let us first consider the truncation in the bottom end, which is easier. Define a function t min ϵ that takes a value distribution, say, D i for some bidder 1 ≤ i ≤ n, as input, and returns a distribution obtained by truncating the lowest ϵ fraction of values in D i down to 0. More precisely, the quantile of any value v in t min ϵ (D i ) is defined as follows:
Further, for any product value distribution D, define:
The truncated version now has 0 as the smallest value in its support. Further, the probability mass of 0 is at least ϵ, which is good enough for the purpose of using Lemma 10. On the other hand, we want to make sure the optimal revenue after the truncation, namely, that of t min ϵ (D), is close to the optimal revenue of the original distribution D. This is established in the next lemma.
Lemma 11. For any product value distribution D, we have:
Next, let us turn to the truncation in the top end. This part is more subtle because it serves two purposes, to satisfy the conditions in Lemma 10 for bounding the KL divergence of the surrogate distributions, and to satisfy the second condition of Lemma 9, namely, to ensure that one can estimate the expected revenue of any mechanism on the auxiliary distribution with standard concentration bounds. For the latter, we would intuitively like to truncate values that are too large, in particular, those that are much larger than the optimal revenue of the surrogate distribution D ′ . Therefore, given an appropriate vector of value upper boundsv, we introduce the following function t max v for truncating the top end of the value distributions. For every bidder i, let t max v i (D i ) be the distribution obtained by truncating values larger thanv i down tov i . In other words, the quantiles of the truncated distribution is defined as:
Informally, we will choose the value upper boundsv such that 1) for any i,v i is upper bounded by the optimal revenue Opt(D) multiplied by a factor that depends on the family of distributions, and 2) for any i, q D i (v i ) is at leastΩ( 1 m ). The first property is to satisfy the conditions in Lemma 9, and the second property is the satisfy the conditions in Lemma 10. We summarize the meta construction of the surrogate distributions and some of their properties in the following lemma.
Lemma 12. For any product value distribution D, suppose there existv, β ≥ Opt(D), and p > 0 such that:
(
Proof. Given such a vectorv, define the surrogate distributions as:
Part a). This is true by the above definition of
, and the first condition in this lemma which impliesv i ≤ p −1 β for all i ∈ [n].
Part b). Note that D ⪰ t max v (D)
. By weak revenue monotonicity (Lemma 3) and the third condition of this lemma, we have:
Putting together we have: 
Part d).
For every bidder i, our construction ensures that D ′ i and
satisfy the conditions of Lemma 10 with u =v i , ℓ = 0, p u ≥ pϵ 2 n −1 =Ω(m −1 ) (due to the second condition in this lemma), and p ℓ ≥ ϵ =Ω(m −1 ) (due to the definition of t min ϵ ). Hence, by Lemma 10 we have:
Then, this part of the lemma follows because
As a corollary, we lower bound the optimal revenue of the auxiliary distributionD by that of the original distribution D when m is sufficiently large, where the bounds depend on the parameters β and p in the conditions of Lemma 12.
Corollary 13. Suppose there existv, β, and p satisfying the conditions in Lemma 12. Then, we have the following lower bound on the optimal revenue of the auxiliary distributionD:
provided that the number of samples m is at least:
Proof. Note that D ′ andD ′ have supports upper bounded by p −1 β (part a) of Lemma 12) , and the expected revenue of any mechanism on any of these two distributions is at most Opt(D) ≤ β (D ⪰ D ′ ,D ′ and weak revenue monotonicity by Lemma 3). By Bernstein inequality (Lemma 1), O(p −1 ϵ −2 ) sample runs are sufficient to estimate the expected revenue of any mechanism on any of these two distributions up to an additive factor of ϵβ. Using Lemma 9 with N = p −1 ϵ −2 , and α = ϵβ we get that:
By part c) of Lemma 12, and weak revenue monotonicity (Lemma 3), we have:
Finally, by part b) of Lemma 12, we have:
Putting together these three inequalities proves the corollary. □ Finally, combining Lemma 8 and Corollary 13, we get the following corollaries which finish the meta analysis. We remark that a direct combination of Lemma 8 and Corollary 13 gives 1 − 4ϵ multiplicative approximation or 4ϵ additive approximation. However, reducing the approximation parameter by a factor of 4 increases the number of samples needed by at most a constant factor because the bounds are polynomial in ϵ −1 . Corollary 14. Suppose there existv and p satisfying the conditions in Lemma 12 with β = Opt(D). Then, with probability at least 1 − δ , we have:
Corollary 15. Suppose there existv and p satisfying the conditions in Lemma 12 with β = 1. Then, with probability at least 1 − δ , we have:
as long as the number of samples m is at least:
Proof of Theorem 1
Finally, we will prove the sample complexity upper bounds for specific families of distributions as stated in Theorem 1. Here, we only show the proof for [0, 1]-bounded support distributions with additive error. Other cases are deferred to the full version [16] . Given Corollary 14 and Corollary 15, it remains to find, for each family of distributions, an appropriate vector of value upper bounds v, together with parameters β ≥ Opt(D) and p > 0, that satisfy the conditions in Lemma 12, which we restate below:
Since this case considers additive approximation, we will rely on Corollary 15 and thus let β = 1. Then, the first condition holds trivially with p = 1. Similar to the previous case, we will choosev i for each i ∈ [n] greedily to be the largest value that satisfies the second condition. That is, definev such that for all i ∈ [n]:
It remains to verify the third condition, which holds due the following sequence of inequalities:
Then, by Corollary 15, we get the sample complexity upper bound ofÕ(nϵ −2 ) as stated in Theorem 1 for [0, 1]-bounded support distributions.
LOWER BOUNDS
In this section, we will prove the following sample complexity lower bounds for all four families of distributions considered in this paper. Each of them matches the corresponding upper bound in Section 3 up to a poly-logarithmic factor. Theorem 2. Suppose an algorithm, given m samples, returns a mechanism that is a 1 − ϵ approximation, with probability at least 0.99, for a given family of distribution. Then, we have:
(1) m is at least Ω(nϵ −3 ) if it is the family of regular distributions; (2) m is at least Ω(nϵ −2 ln −2 n) =Ω(nϵ −2 ) if it is the family of MHR distributions; (3) m is at least Ω(nHϵ −2 ) if it is the family of [1, H ]-bounded distributions.
Suppose it is an ϵ additive approximation with probability at least 0.99. Then, we have:
We will present the meta construction of hard instances in Section 4.1, and the corresponding meta analysis in Section 4.2. We deferred to the full version [16] how to use them to prove the sample complexity lower bounds stated in Theorem 2.
Meta Hard Instance
Our construction of hard instances relies on finding three distributions in the family:
(1) D b , a base distribution that is a point mass. The bidder with this distribution will serve as the default winner unless another bidder realizes an extremely high value. (2) D h , a distribution that has a relatively higher chance to win over D b . (3) D ℓ , a distribution that has a relatively lower chance to win over D b .
Given these distributions, consider the following family of hard instances. Let bidder 1's value follows the base distribution D b . For any other bidder 2 ≤ i ≤ n, let her value distribution be either D h or D ℓ . Formally, let:
Our plan is to show that any algorithm that gets a good enough approximation on all distributions in H must take a lot of samples.
What properties do we need from these three distributions D b , D h , and D ℓ in order to show a sample complexity lower bound? Let ϕ b , ϕ h , ϕ ℓ denote the corresponding virtual value functions. The above conditions are essential for our construction of the meta hard instance. The following three, on the other hand, are for the convenience of our argument. f) For any value v 1 > v ≥ v 2 , we have
Here, the factor √ 2 can be replaced by any other constants. Our instances will in fact satisfy this condition up to 1 ± ϵ. g) D h is regular. h) Either v 1 = +∞, or v 1 is a point mass and an upper bound of values in both D h and D ℓ .
Intuitively, to construct a mechanism that gives an approximately optimal expected revenue w.r.t. an unknown product value distribution in H , the algorithm must be able to distinguish bidders with value distribution D h , and those with value distribution D ℓ , from the samples. Otherwise, when there was exactly a bidder with a value between v 1 and v 2 , the algorithm could not correctly decide whether to pick her to be the winner over the default winner, namely, bidder 1. We formalize this intuition with the following lemma and its proof in the next subsection. Lemma 16. If an algorithm takes m samples from an arbitrary product value distribution D ∈ H and returns, with probability at least 0.99, a mechanism whose expected revenue is at least:
Then, the number of samples m is at least:
Meta Analysis: Proof of Lemma 16
For some sufficiently small constant c, suppose for contrary that the algorithm, denoted as A,
We will account for the revenue loss due to the mistakes made by the mechanism chosen by algorithm A on a bidder by bidder basis. Concretely, for every bidder 2 ≤ i ≤ n, define a subset of value vector V i as follows:
Note that V 2 , V 3 , . . . , V n are disjoint. We will account for the revenue loss due to the mistakes made on the value vectors in each subset V i separately.
Proof Sketch. The plan is to prove the lemma by showing there is a distribution D ∈ H such that for at least Θ(n) different bidders 2 ≤ i ≤ n, the mechanism chosen by the algorithm with m < c · D SKL (D h , D ℓ ) −1 samples will make a lot of mistakes on the value vectors in V i and, as a result, will have a revenue loss of Ω(p∆). This will be formalized in Corollary 23 and Lemma 24.
How do we prove that? We will do so by showing that for any 2 ≤ i ≤ n, and for a randomly chosen pair of distributions in H that differ only in the i-th coordinate, the algorithm A must have an Ω(p∆) revenue loss due to value vectors in V i on at least one of the two distributions. This will be formally proved in Lemma 21. Then, the aforementioned claim follows by a simple counting argument, via Lemma 22. Intuitively, this is because the algorithm A cannot distinguish such a pair of distributions with so few samples but the winner must be selected differently for the two distributions for value vectors in V i . This intuition is formalized with a sequence of claims in Lemma 17, Corollary 18, and Lemma 19.
Formal Proof. Next, we instantiate the above proof sketch with a formal argument. Fix any 2 ≤ i ≤ n, and any
H be a pair of distributions that differ only in the i-th coordinate. Then, we have:
samples for some sufficiently small constant c, by Lemma 4, it cannot distinguish whether the underlying distribution is D 1 or D 2 correctly, and as a result will choose a mechanism from essentially the same distribution in both cases.
On the other hand, the optimal auctions w.r.t. D 1 and D 2 pick different bidders as the winner for value vectors in V i : the one w.r.t. D 1 allocates the item to bidder i, while the one w.r.t. D 2 allocates the item to the default winner, i.e., bidder 1. To instantiate this intuition, we first formally show that the subsets of mechanisms that are close to optimal for D 1 and D 2 respectively, in terms of their choices of winners when the value vector is in V i , are disjoint. We start with the following technical lemma.
Lemma 17. For any mechanism M, the probability that M picks bidder i as the winner, conditioned on the value vector v is in V i , differs by at most a factor of 2 whether v is drawn from D 1 or D 2 .
In the proof of this lemma the the rest of the subsection, we will use Pr v∼D:v∈V to denote the conditional probability when v is drawn from D conditioned on v ∈ V for some subset V of value vectors. Similarly, we will use E v∼D:v∈V to denote the conditional expectation.
Next, we define the following partitions of mechanisms: .
For any value vector v ∈ V i , recall that the optimal auction w.r.t. D 1 will allocate the item to bidder i while the one w.r.t. D 2 will allocate the item to the default winner, i.e., bidder 1. Therefore, if the underlying distribution is D 1 and the value vector is in V i , the mechanisms in M 2 will pick a wrong winner with probability at least 1 3 by definition. Similarly, if the underlying distribution is D 2 and the value vector is in V i , the mechanisms in M 1 will pick a wrong winner with probability at least 1 3 by Corollary 18. Informally, the algorithm shall return a mechanism in M j most of the time if the underlying distribution is D j for j ∈ {1, 2}, in order to ensure that the expected revenue is close to optimal.
Next, we formalize the intuition that A is taking too few samples to make different decisions on D 1 and D 2 with the following lemma.
Lemma 19. For either j = 1 or j = 2 (or both), we have:
Proof. Consider the following algorithm for distinguishing the two distributions D 1 and D 2 . Given an unknown distribution D ∈ {D 1 , D 2 }, run algorithm A with m samples from D. If the mechanism returned by A, i.e., A(D), is in M 1 , return D 1 ; otherwise, return D 2 . By our assumption for contrary that A takes less than c · D SKL (D 1 , D 2 ) −1 samples, it cannot distinguish the two distributions correctly (Lemma 4). That is, we have either Pr A(D 1 ) ∈ M 1 < 2 3 , or Pr A(D 2 ) ∈ M 2 < 2 3 , or both. The lemma follows by that M 1 and M 2 form a partition of the mechanism space. □ Next, we will account for the revenue loss when the algorithm A makes a mistake in the sense that it chooses a mechanism in M 3−j when the underlying distribution is D j as in the statement of the previous lemma. We first need to show a technical lemma. Lemma 20. For any value distribution D ∈ H , the optimal mechanism w.r.t. D always chooses the bidder with highest virtual value as winner.
Proof. Recall that the optimal auction picks the bidder with the highest non-negative ironed virtual value. By our construction, bidder 1's value is a point mass and always has virtual value equals her value v 0 . Hence, non-negativity holds trivially. It remains to show that the highest ironed virtual value coincides with the highest virtual value.
Suppose v 1 < +∞ and there is at least one bidder 2 ≤ i ≤ n with value equals v 1 . Then, her virtual value is also v 1 due to condition h). As a result, the highest virtual value, ironed or not, equals max{v 0 , v 1 }, because the ironed virtual value of any bidder 2 ≤ j i ≤ n cannot exceed her value, which is upper bounded by v 1 .
Next, suppose no bidder 2 ≤ i ≤ n has a value equals v 1 . In this case, any bidder whose value distribution is D ℓ cannot have an ironed virtual value higher than that of bidder 1. To see this, first note that condition h) indicates v 1 is not in any ironed interval. Further, by conditions d) and e), the virtual value in D ℓ is at most v 0 for any value other than v 1 . The ironed value is simply the average over the corresponding ironed interval, and therefore cannot be larger than v 0 .
It remains to consider bidders whose value distribution is D h . The lemma now follows by condition g), which states that D h is regular. □
In the following discussions, let ϕ A(D j ) (v) denote the virtual value of the winner chosen by A(D j ) when the value vector is v. By the connection between expected revenue and virtual values showed by Myerson [21] , and Lemma 20, we have: 
To account for the revenue loss due to value vectors in V i , we will consider the following quantity:
We will prove that the above quantity is at least Ω(p∆) for either D = D 1 , or D = D 2 , or both, with the following lemmas.
Lemma 21. For either j = 1 or j = 2 (or both), we have:
Proof. Let j ∈ {1, 2} be the superscript for which the conclusion of Lemma 19 holds. Then, it suffices to show that:
Case 1: j = 1. By A(D 1 ) ∈ M 2 , we have that: 
So the claim follows. □ Let B D denote the set of bidders for which algorithm A performs badly in the sense that the mechanism returned by A suffers from a revenue loss of at least ∆ 3 conditioned on V i , with probability at least 1 3 , as stated in Lemma 21:
Lemma 22. Suppose a distribution D is drawn uniformly at random from H . Then, for any 2 ≤ i ≤ n, we have: 
In the rest of the analysis, we will focus on the distribution D ∈ H for which the conclusion of the above corollary holds. The above corollary is already good enough for proving a weaker claim that the expected revenue loss is at least Θ(np∆), noting that the probability of having a value vector in V i for each i ∈ B D is Θ(p) due to conditions c) and d).
To get the stronger claim in Lemma 16 that we have the stated revenue loss with a (small) constant probability, we need to further discuss the the number of bidders for which the realized mechanism A(D) performs poorly. For any realization of the mechanism A(D) returned by the algorithm, further let B D,A(D) denote the set of bidders for which the returned mechanism A(D) performs poorly in the sense that it suffers from a revenue loss at least ∆ 3 on V i :
